The Future of Bail in California: Analyzing SB 10 Through the Prism of Past Reforms by Peterson, Adam
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 53 
Number 1 Developments of the Law Article 6 
Fall 11-1-2019 
The Future of Bail in California: Analyzing SB 10 Through the 
Prism of Past Reforms 
Adam Peterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam Peterson, The Future of Bail in California: Analyzing SB 10 Through the Prism of Past Reforms, 53 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 263 (2019). 
This Developments in the Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons 
@ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola 
Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
(11) 53.1_PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020 6:36 PM 
 
263 
THE FUTURE OF BAIL IN CALIFORNIA: 
ANALYZING SB 10 THROUGH THE PRISM OF 
PAST REFORMS 
Adam Peterson* 
          The cash bail system is the cause of numerous injustices. It favors 
the rich over the poor, it packs jails to the breaking point, and it forces 
those who have yet to be found guilty to sit in jail—often for weeks or 
months at a time. In 2018, the California legislature passed SB 10. The 
bill purported to abolish cash bail wholesale and replace it with a risk 
assessment program. While SB 10 is a step in the right direction, it faces 
many obstacles before it accomplishes its goal. This Note examines the 
bill in light of past attempts at criminal justice reform, suggests what a 
successful SB 10 might look like, and offers a solution for how to get 
there.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the night of November 2, 2015, 18-year-old Daniel Soto went 
to McDonald’s with his friends.1 While there, a man attacked him and 
his friends with a knife, slicing Daniel from his chest to his stomach.2 
Daniel’s friends fought back, and the attacker ran.3 The attacker 
eventually found a police officer and reported that Daniel’s group had 
accosted him.4 Daniel was arrested and brought to a hospital, where 
he was handcuffed to his hospital bed after doctors operated on him.5 
He was then charged with felony assault.6 Daniel pleaded “not guilty,” 
and a judge set his bail at $30,000.7 Neither Daniel nor his family 
could pay, and no bail bondsman offered a payment plan that they 
could afford.8 As a result, Daniel stayed in jail for weeks.9 Finally, on 
December 17, Daniel had his preliminary hearing, where the same 
judge who set his bail found that there was no evidence he committed 
the crime and summarily dismissed the case.10 Though he was finally 
able to return home, Daniel had missed six weeks of school.11 Having 
always been a slow learner, he was unable to catch up and ultimately 
dropped out of school.12 This teenager’s life was turned on its head 
simply because his family could not afford to bail him out. 
Compare Daniel’s story with that of Tiffany Li, a Northern 
California real estate heiress who was arrested for a far worse crime—
directing two men to murder the father of her children.13 Despite the 
seriousness of the alleged crime and the fact that she had family in 
China, indicating that she was a potential flight risk, she was quickly 
released from jail because she and her friends were able to raise her 
 
 1. Nazish Dholakia, Witness: Falsely Accused and Locked Up in California, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Apr. 11, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/11/witness-falsely-
accused-and-locked-california. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Keith Green, Hillsborough Woman Accused of Killing Father of Her Kids Out on Bail, 
ABC7 (Apr. 6, 2017), https://abc7news.com/news/bay-area-murder-suspect-released-after-posting-
bail/1842656. 
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$35 million bail.14 The differences between Tiffany and Daniel’s 
experiences illustrate the problems associated with cash bail, which 
disproportionately burdens the poor.15 
The ills of the cash bail system in the United States have been 
well-chronicled. Sixty percent of those in jail in America have not 
been convicted of any crime; that’s more than 450,000 people sitting 
in jail cells either because they cannot afford bail, are flight risks, or 
have been deemed a danger to public safety.16 Compared to the rest of 
the world, America’s pretrial detention rates are staggering. Despite 
having only 4 percent of the world’s population, the United States has 
nearly 20 percent of the world’s pretrial jail population.17 These 
numbers come with equally staggering costs to American taxpayers. 
Taxpayers spend nearly $38 million per day to house inmates in 
pretrial detention.18 
The effects of pretrial detention on those detained are equally 
pernicious. Detainees are pressured to enter guilty pleas so that they 
can get out of jail and go home to their families.19 If they don’t, they 
are subject to situations like Daniel’s—sitting in jail for weeks (and 
sometimes months) on end, away from family, friends, and support.20 
Those who choose not to plead guilty may lose jobs, homes, and even 
custody of children.21 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Sam Levin, Wealthy Murder Suspect Freed on Bail as Man Accused of Welfare 
Fraud Stuck in Jail, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5YHY-23ZS. 
 16. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 4 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf.; see also ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRE-
TRIAL/REMAND IMPRISONMENT LIST, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RES. (3d ed. 2016), 
https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ 
wptril_3rd_edition.pdf (reporting that the number of people in pre-trial/remand imprisonment in 
the United States is 467,500). 
 17. Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Oct. 2014), 
www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration (“While the United States has only 5 percent of the 
world’s population, it has nearly 25 percent of its prisoners—about 2.2 million people.”). 
 18. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileK
ey=c2f50513-2f9d-2719-c990-a1e991a57303&forceDialog=0. 
 19. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2492–93 (2004). 
 20. Dholakia, supra note 1. 
 21. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 (2017). 
(11) 53.1_PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  6:36 PM 
2019] SB 10 AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL IN CALIFORNIA 267 
The insidious effects of the cash bail system are felt nationwide.22 
Certain states, however, exacerbate the problem with overly draconian 
bail systems. California is one of those states. California’s detention 
rate and median bail are significantly higher than the national 
average.23 Although California law mandates that judges analyze a 
variety of factors when setting bail, recent studies have shown that 
California courts tend to simply use the bail schedule alone, making 
the defendant’s personal wealth the sole factor in determining 
release.24 This, in part, has led to California’s severe pretrial detention 
problem.25 To wit, the nationwide pretrial detention rate for felony 
defendants is 32 percent; in California, that number is a staggering 59 
percent.26 Rates of pretrial misconduct are higher in California than 
they are elsewhere.27 And the median bail in the state is five times 
higher than it is in the rest of the country.28 
To address the numerous problems of cash bail, Senator Robert 
Hertzberg (D-Van Nuys) introduced Senate Bill 10 (“SB 10”) in 
December of 2016.29 Initially, this proposal seemed like a step in the 
right direction. The bill provided for a broad presumption in favor of 
pretrial release, with very narrow exceptions based on public safety.30 
However, the version of SB 10 that ultimately passed disappointed 
reformers; the previously narrow public safety exceptions had been 
expanded, as had both judicial and prosecutorial discretion to detain. 
This final version, passed in August 2018, will be subject to the will 
 
 22. See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
673, 679 (2018). 
 23. Sonya Tafoya, Pretrial Detention and Jail Capacity in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 
fig. 3 (July 2015), https://perma.cc/E2U9-AEME. 
 24. See generally Christine S. Scott-Hayward & Sarah Ottone, Punishing Poverty: 
California’s Unconstitutional Bail System, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/punishing-poverty/ (finding that judges in California 
rarely deviate from the bail schedule). 
 25. Id. at 172–73. 
 26. Tafoya, supra note 23. 
 27. SONYA TAFOYA ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., PRETRIAL RELEASE IN CALIFORNIA 5 
(2017), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_0517STR.pdf. 
 28. It’s Time to Do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 7, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/editorials/article143174454.html. 
 29. S.B. 10, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 30. See Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2018 
Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
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of California voters, who will vote on whether the law takes effect in 
November 2020.31 
Though reformers had high hopes for SB 10, California’s history 
of criminal justice reform is littered with well-intentioned ideas that 
either failed outright or have unforeseen deleterious effects.32 Despite 
this troubled past, reformers continue to push for the same movements, 
ignoring the lessons of history.33 Specifically, legislators and 
reformers have historically ignored that the implementation of reform 
measures is reliant on actors, such as judges and prosecutors, within 
the criminal justice system. These actors tend to have great incentive 
to maintain the status quo—or, in the face of pressure to initiate 
reform, perhaps even become more restrictive. Judges must cater to an 
electorate that might vote them out of office should they release an 
arrestee who then goes on to commit a major crime. Prosecutors, as 
elected officials, share a similar burden. Should judges be seen as 
overly forgiving of arrestees, they risk prosecutors exercising 
peremptory challenges, keeping lenient judges from ever seeing 
certain types of cases.34 By contrast, there is almost no incentive to 
release arrestees. After all, the costs and injustices of 
overincarceration do not redound directly to judges or prosecutors—
the costs of being lenient do. 
This Note seeks to: (1) examine the ultimate influence that 
criminal justice actors might wield on SB 10; and (2) how to expect 
and account for it. Specifically, it will examine trends, both modern 
and historical, that indicate reformers consistently fail to consider the 
dramatic effect criminal justice actors have on reforms. By seeking to 
understand the motivations of these parties, this Note attempts to set a 
reasonable expectation for what SB 10’s success might look like and 
provide a roadmap for how to get there. 
 
 31. Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on 
the 2020 Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article224682595.html. 
 32. Sacramento Bee & ProPublica, A Brief History of California’s Epic Journey Toward 
Prison Reform, PAC. STANDARD (May 29, 2019), www.psmag.com/social-justice/a-brief-history-
of-california-prison-reform. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2011); see also SACRAMENTO CTY. PUB. L. 
LIBR., PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF A JUDGE: REMOVE THE JUDGE FROM YOUR CASE, 
https://saclaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sbs-peremptory-challenge-of-a-judge.pdf (“If . . . you 
believe you cannot get a fair and impartial hearing or trial from the judge . . . assigned to your case, 
California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 170.6 gives you the right to disqualify him or her 
without having to show a reason.”). 
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Part II analyzes the history of cash bail and bail reform 
movements throughout both United States and California history. It 
also examines the introduction and development of SB 10. Part III 
seeks to answer why past reforms have so often failed and determine 
how reformers can learn from past failures. Part IV closely analyzes 
how judicial system actors have affected reforms throughout 
California’s history and how reformers now can expect courtroom 
players to exercise their discretion with regards to SB 10. Part V looks 
at current bail reform efforts and determines that judges and 
prosecutors—influenced by the factors described in Part IV—tend to 
use their discretionary powers to ultimately cancel out the intended 
effects of those reforms. Part VI asks what reformers can do in 
California to ensure that SB 10 does not fail in similar ways, and also 
seeks to determine what a successful SB 10 might look like. Part VII 
concludes that, while SB 10 might not achieve all the goals that its 
high-minded creators envisioned, it is not doomed to fail—so long as 
reformers temper their expectations and implement the bill with the 
competing interests of the court system in mind. 
II.  CASH BAIL: A HISTORY OF FRUSTRATED REFORM EFFORTS 
A.  Cash Bail and Reform in the United States 
The American cash bail system, like most of the American legal 
system, has its roots in English law.35 Early English law allowed 
sheriffs wide discretion to deny bail, but a series of reforms 
culminating in the Bill of Rights of 1689 limited the denial of bail and 
led to a presumption of granting bail for all noncapital cases.36 
The early American legal system adopted this presumption, and 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries American courts 
considered denying bail in noncapital cases a violation of the 
presumption of innocence.37 The Framers also included the common 
law prohibition against excessive bail in the Bill of Rights with the 
Eighth Amendment.38 The purpose of bail in this early period of 
American history was to ensure that the defendant returned for trial, 
 
 35. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the 
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1733 (2018). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”). 
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not to keep the public safe by preventing additional crimes.39 Rather 
than require bail, it was far more common for an accused to be released 
into a third party’s custody.40 This third party would ensure the 
accused’s reappearance either by personally vouching for them or by 
putting up their own property as collateral; this was called a surety 
bond.41 
The commercial bail bond industry began to supersede the surety 
system in the late nineteenth century, leading to a system that favored 
the rich over the poor. Now a defendant’s personal wealth, rather than 
a voucher from his friends, could guarantee his pretrial freedom.42 In 
1927, a study reported that the bail system in Chicago led to a higher 
proportion of arrestees who could not afford even small amounts of 
bail and so were forced to stay in jail.43 Another study in the 1950s 
noted that many arrestees in Philadelphia were unable to afford their 
release and thus pleaded guilty in order to avoid jail time.44 Outraged 
by the “plight of poor defendants in crowded jails,” activists began 
pushing for bail reform in the early 1960s.45 
The most notable reform effort is the 1961 Manhattan Bail 
Project, started by a social worker, Herbert Sturz, and a wealthy 
philanthropist, Louis Schweitzer.46 Sturz and Schweitzer were 
shocked by the squalid conditions of New York’s pretrial detention 
facilities.47 The two set up an experiment, staffed by volunteers, that 
interviewed and ran background checks on arrestees in an attempt to 
obviate the need for cash bail altogether.48 If the volunteers found that 
the arrestee had sufficient ties to the community, they would 
recommend to the judge that the arrestee be released on his own 
recognizance: a promise that he would return for his court date.49 The 
volunteers would then stay in touch with the arrestees to remind them 
 
 39. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 731 
(2011); see also Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (holding that the purpose of bail was 
to “compel[] the party to submit to the trial and punishment, which the law ordains for his offence”). 
 40. Feeley, supra note 22, at 684. 
 41. See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1733. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1735. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Feeley, supra note 22, at 692. 
 47. Id. at 682–83. 
 48. Id. at 682. 
 49. Id. 
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of their upcoming court appearances.50 After a year, the Project 
evaluated itself and found that out of 250 arrestees who had been 
released, only three failed to appear.51 
The Manhattan Bail Project’s success garnered the attention of 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who launched the 1964 National 
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice to change the country’s bail 
laws.52 The conference eventually led to Congress passing the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966, which was meant to “assure that all persons, 
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained” 
pretrial.53 In general, the act established that a defendant’s financial 
status should not be a factor in denying release.54 Also of importance, 
the act authorized a judge to consider a defendant’s dangerousness as 
a reason to deny bail—the first time in American history this had 
explicitly been authorized.55 
This provision opened the door to an eventual about-face in the 
purpose of bail—from ensuring an arrestee’s return for trial to 
ensuring the safety of the community. As crime rates rose in the late 
1960s and early 1970s and the political winds shifted sharply, 
commentators opined that bail reform efforts ignored the crimes 
committed by those released pretrial, and that new reforms were 
required to ensure public safety.56 These concerns were not 
unfounded; even today, arrestees who post bail and then commit 
another crime are all too common.57 Richard Nixon was elected 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970); see also Sarah Johnson, Bail Reform, BILL TRACK 50 (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/social-issues/civil-rights/bail-reform/ (“[T]he purpose of 
this act is to ensure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be 
detained pending their charges . . . when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public 
interest.”). 
 54. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1736. 
 55. Id. at 1736–37. 
 56. Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 24, 32 (1969). 
 57. See, e.g., Teri Figueroa, When People on Bail Commit New Crimes, They’re Often Linked 
to Drugs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/sd-me-bail-crime-data-20180926-
story.html (describing how 4,149 people committed new felonies between October 2011 through 
August 2018 while released on bail, and how many of the new crimes were drug offenses); Kirsten 
Fiscus, Out on Bond, Arrested Again: When Constitutional Rights Clash with Public Safety, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Aug. 31, 2018, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/crime/2018/08/31/out-bond-arrested-again-
when-constitutional-rights-clash-public-safety-bail-violent-repeat-offender/945143002 
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against the backdrop of rising panic over crime rates, and he made 
preventive pretrial detention a focus of his “War on Crime.”58 
Preventive detention was not popular just because it purportedly 
made the streets safer. It also was very popular amongst prosecutors 
and police because it helped the system function much more 
efficiently.59 Prosecutors knew (and still know) that, once a defendant 
is forced to sit in jail, the defendant is more likely to plead guilty to 
get out of jail, even if he did not do the alleged crime; essentially, 
forcing a defendant to remain behind bars increases the number of 
convictions that prosecutors get.60 Prosecutors also viewed preventive 
detention as a central part of their mission: to “reduce crime and 
protect society.”61 
The push towards preventive detention reached its zenith when 
the Reagan Administration passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which 
required judges to predict the danger levels an arrestee presented to 
the community before releasing him.62 The Supreme Court found the 
act constitutional in United States v. Salerno,63 explicitly sanctioning 
preventive detention based on an arrestee’s danger to society.64 
Salerno completed the reversal in the nation’s approach to bail reform. 
The idealistic reform movements of the mid-1960s, which sought to 
reduce pretrial detention based on poverty, ended up having very little 
 
(discussing how, in Montgomery County, Alabama, four arrestees were released on bail despite 
being charged with murder, and then went on to reoffend); Paul Milo, Bail Reform Again Criticized 
After Freed Newark Suspect Charged in Shooting, NJ.COM (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nj.com/essex/2017/03/bail_reform_again_criticized_after_freed_newark_su.html 
(reporting a man released pursuant to New Jersey bail reform law charged with aggravated assault). 
 58. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1739. 
 59. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL 
IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19–20 (2018). 
 60. Id.; see also Jeffrey Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the 
Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 441, 456–57 (noting that only 1 percent 
to 10 percent of defendants who are detained pretrial make it to trial—most accept a plea bargain). 
Interestingly, this use of pretrial detention in the United States shares many similarities with its use 
in Latin America. The largest population of pretrial detainees in the world is found in Latin 
America, and detention is often used “frequently—and often arbitrarily.” This results in countries 
such as Bolivia having over 80 percent of their prison populations made up of pretrial detainees. 
Marguerite Cawley, Mapping Latin America’s Pretrial Detention Populations, INSIGHT CRIME 
(Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mapping-latin-americas-pretrial-
detention-populations/. 
 61. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 335, 340 (1990). 
 62. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 59, at 25. 
 63. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 64. See id. 
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effect; in fact, the end result was a much more expansive system of 
pretrial detention.65 
Due to the preventive detention movement, courts began using 
money bail as a tool to detain based on pretrial crime risk.66 As such, 
since 1990, pretrial detention rates67 and courts’ use of money bail 
have skyrocketed.68 These trends have led to well-documented 
injustices. The most obvious is the inherent classism of a money-bail 
system. Many of those detained pretrial are held because they cannot 
afford their bail, a problem that obviously does not affect wealthy 
arrestees.69 Racism is also a not-so-hidden evil of the system. Due to 
pervasive problems of race bias in the criminal justice system,70 
Hispanic and black defendants are more likely to be detained pretrial 
than similarly situated white defendants.71 Widespread pretrial 
detention also places crippling costs on both individuals and their 
communities. Studies have shown that contact with the criminal 
justice system, even for a short time, tends to have criminogenic 
consequences; as such, pretrial detention makes a person more likely 
 
 65. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1743 (“[W]hat began in the mid-1960s as an effort 
to reduce poverty-based pretrial detention ended in the mid-1980s with a law that led to 
immediate—and lasting—increases in pretrial detention.”). 
 66. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 547 
(2012) (noting that “judges are basing their [bail] decisions far more on predicted violence than on 
predicted flight”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 434 (2016) 
(highlighting the “stiff, often successful resistance from the powerful bail bondsman lobby” that 
any effort to limit money bail has met). 
 67. Cf. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1996, (1997), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjimy96.pdf; MINTON & ZENG, supra note 16, at 3 (estimating 
that there were approximately 467,500 people awaiting trial in local jails in 2014 on any given day). 
 68. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf (finding that between 1990 and 1994, 41 percent of 
pretrial releases were on recognizance compared to 24 percent by cash bail; in 2004, 23 percent of 
releases were on recognizance and 42 percent were by cash bail). 
 69. See Levin, supra note 15. 
 70. See Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal-Justice System is 
Racist. Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-
that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/?utm_term=.89499895294d. 
 71. Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in 
the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 233–34 (2004). Black defendants are 1.5 times 
more likely to be detained pretrial than white defendants, while Hispanic defendants are 1.8 times 
more likely to be detained than white defendants. Id. This is mostly because racial minorities are 
far more likely to have to pay bail rather than be released on recognizance; black defendants are 
twice as likely as white defendants to be assigned bail, while Hispanics are 1.4 times as likely to 
be assigned bail. Id. 
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to commit a crime in the future.72 Because those detained pretrial tend 
to be those that can’t afford bail, they also have less access to 
competent legal aid, making those detained more likely to be 
sentenced to jail than those released pretrial73 and likelier to face 
longer sentences.74 Detention also leads those who are innocent to 
accept plea offers simply so they can go home—the only other option 
being to sit in jail until trial.75 Should they instead choose to stay in 
jail, they face the prospect of losing jobs, homes, and families.76 
Finally, pretrial detention presents an enormous cost to the community 
at large; taxpayers nationwide spend nearly $38 million per day on 
detaining arrestees.77 
In response to these problems, there has been a recent “third-
wave” of bail reforms to remedy the ills of cash bail.78 Spurred by civil 
rights groups and national policy movements, several states have 
begun implementing legislation that seeks to reduce or end the use of 
money bail. For example, New Jersey’s Bail Reform and Speedy Trial 
Act purports to almost completely end the use of money bail in that 
state.79 While the spread of state legislative bail reform is encouraging, 
there is not yet enough data to show whether the reforms have 
significantly addressed bail’s major problems.80 
These third-wave reforms generally seek to balance the dueling 
goals of the previous two: releasing as many defendants pre-trial as 
possible, while also preventively detaining those who are deemed to 
 
 72. See Heaton et al., supra note 21, at 718 (explaining that pretrial detainees are 30 percent 
more likely to commit a felony and 20 percent more likely to commit a misdemeanor within 
eighteen months of their detention than those similarly situated but released pretrial). 
 73. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION, PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 2 
(2013), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Pretrial-Criminal-Justice-
Research.pdf (“[D]efendants who were detained for the entire pretrial period were over four times 
more likely to be sentenced to jail and over three times more likely to be sentenced to prison than 
defendants who were released at some point pending trial.”). 
 74. Id. (finding that those detained pretrial were, on average, given sentences that were three 
times longer than those released). 
 75. Heaton et al., supra note 21, at 714–16. 
 76. See JUSTICE REVIEW COMM., SANTA CLARA CTY. HUMAN RELATIONS COMM’N, REPORT 
ON THE “PUBLIC FORUM FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS OF INMATES” 36–37 (2016), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/hrcon/Documents/SCCHRCJailReportFINAL_04-26-16.pdf. 
 77. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 18. 
 78. Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DEN. L. REV. (Mar. 14, 
2011), https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-
bail-reform.html?rq=schnacke. 
 79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2019). 
 80. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 
340 (2018). 
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be dangerous.81 Despite the hopes of more idealistic reformers, it will 
be impossible to implement bail reforms that release nearly all 
defendants; prosecutors, law enforcement officers, victims’ rights 
groups, and bail bondsmen will all vigorously oppose any measure so 
broad.82 As a result, though some reform groups seek completely 
liberalized pretrial detention,83 more realistic reforms will seek to 
balance the two competing interests. The criminal justice system must 
offer some measure of safety, and the public is unlikely to feel safe 
unless there is some form of preventive detention.84 
B.  History of Cash Bail in California: From the California 
Constitution to SB 10 
Pretrial release has been an element of California’s legal system 
since the state was established. Both the 1849 and 1879 versions of 
the California Constitution included sections that were identical to the 
Eighth Amendment in forbidding the use of excessive bail.85 
However, those at the California Constitutional Convention felt it was 
important to add a second provision, specifically providing that “all 
persons shall be bailable . . . unless for capital offences, when the 
proof is evident or the presumption great.”86 Without this clause, those 
 
 81. S.B. 10 § 1, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“It is the intent of the 
Legislature by enacting this measure to permit preventive detention of pretrial defendants only in 
a manner that is consistent with the United States Constitution . . . and only to the extent permitted 
by the California Constitution.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 
supra note 30, at 14–15 (“SB 10 would endanger public safety by forcing release of . . . high risk 
misdemeanor defendants without bail. Bail is an important public safety tool because it is paid for 
by the defendants [sic] family and close friends who cosign the bail agreement vouch for the 
defendant. These cosigners now have a financial incentive to make sure defendant attends all of his 
or her court dates.”). 
 83. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S 
PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 3 (2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usbail0417_web_0.pdf (arguing that 
California’s bail system should be replaced by a citation system, whereby almost all defendants are 
booked and released immediately). 
 84. See, e.g., Marc Klaas, California Bail Reform Bill May Be Trendy, but It Would Hurt 
Victims’ Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 28, 2018, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article207085264.html (arguing that legislators 
should not follow the “current trend in criminal justice legislation that puts more value on the rights 
of accused criminals than it does on the health, safety, and welfare of crime victims or the greater 
public at large”). 
 85. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 6; CAL. CONST. OF 1879, art. I, § 6 (“Excessive bail shall 
not be required . . . .”). 
 86. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 7. 
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at the convention feared “an innocent man may be kept in prison and 
refused bail.”87 
Even at this early point in California’s legal history, members of 
the convention were concerned about judges abusing their 
discretion—despite judicial discretion being limited to capital cases 
and requiring a finding that “proof [was] evident or the presumption 
great.”88 One member refused to vote for the new clause, worried that, 
if “left to the courts to decide,” they may “decide it in their own 
way.”89 Because the standard was so indefinite, he was concerned that 
its use might “lead to acts of injustice and partiality.”90 
Despite the lofty intentions of the California Constitutional 
Convention, problems in the bail system emerged rather quickly. A 
study of Alameda’s court system in the early period of California’s 
statehood demonstrated how the bail provisions of the California 
Constitution were actually implemented. Similar to courts around the 
country, California courts were not supposed to use bail to keep 
dangerous people behind bars.91 However, in practice, using bail to 
detain the dangerous was common.92 Furthermore, those that were 
granted bail typically could not afford it.93 Between 1880 and 1910, 
an average of 80.4 percent of detainees did not make bail.94 In a pattern 
that has repeated itself to the present day, those who made bail were 
much more likely to be acquitted or have their charges dismissed than 
those who did not.95 Clearly, California’s early courts were not free 
from the inequities that still exist. 
The problems were exacerbated by the introduction of a 
mandatory bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses in 1945.96 Though 
 
 87. J. ROSS BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON 
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849 579 (1850), 
https://cdn.loc.gov//service/gdc/calbk/196.pdf. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 162 (Morris S. Arnold ed., 1981). 
 92. Id. (citing the case of Isabella Martin, who had attempted to dynamite the home of a 
superior court judge, an act of violence that so appalled the judge on her case that he set Martin’s 
bail at $50,000, a large sum today that was enormous in the late nineteenth century to ensure that 
she remained in prison). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 163. 
 95. Id. at 165–66. 
 96. WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 211–12 (1976) (citing CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1269(b) (1970) (instituting mandatory bail schedules for felonies in 1973)). 
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the bail schedule was intended to help arrestees get out of jail before 
their first court appearance, it became a tool used by the courts to 
routinize the pretrial release hearing.97 By using the offense 
underlying the arrest as a presumptive means of determining the bail 
amount, courts deprived arrestees of an individualized release 
determination.98 This only worsened the bail system’s unequal effects 
on the poor, since similarly charged people would have different 
chances of release based on their ability to afford bail.99 
By the 1960s, a large proportion of arrestees remained in jail prior 
to trial, despite the mandates of the California Constitution.100 
Scholars of the time decried California’s “anachronistic system” of 
bail and proposed implementing systems that operated like the 
Manhattan Bail Project.101 Soon enough, idealists began attempting 
reform, both in the legislature and in the form of bail projects.102 In 
the late 1960s, California began the process of revising its constitution, 
recommending that article 1, section 6 be revised to include a 
provision for release on recognizance.103 The electorate eventually 
adopted the proposed change, which became article 1, section 12.104 
Despite the legislature’s emphasis on release on recognizance, 
practical reform efforts in California took a different tack. Perhaps 
because the commercial bond industry was founded in California, 
bondsmen were more powerful than in other states, and the idea of 
eliminating (or even drastically reducing) money bail was never 
seriously considered.105 Because of this, the alternative release 
 
 97. Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 172. 
 98. Id. at 167, 170. 
 99. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 n.31 (1985). 
 100. See FORD FOUND. & CTY. OF ALAMEDA, PRE-TRIAL RELEASE IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 
28 (1967) (finding that 64 percent of felony arrestees and 39 percent of misdemeanor arrestees 
remained in jail until trial). 
 101. See, e.g., Dan Lang, Beyond the Bail System: A Proposal for Pretrial Release in 
California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1112, 1112 (1969). 
 102. Id. at 1125. 
 103. PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 21 (2017), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/PDRReport-20171023.pdf [hereinafter PDR REPORT]. 
 104. Id.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“A person may be released on his or her own recognizance 
in the court’s discretion.”). 
 105. MALCOLM C. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 40 
(1983). 
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programs made popular in Manhattan and much of the rest of the 
country were generally small and poorly funded in California.106 
However, there was one exception. Oakland established a release-
on-recognizance unit in 1964 that was well funded by the Ford 
Foundation.107 Unfortunately, this increased funding did not lead to 
significant change. Although nonmonetary releases initially increased 
by a small amount, most of those released were people who would 
have been able to afford bail anyway.108 The supervisors of the project 
were so scared of failure—of a rise in rates of failure to appear for trial 
or of crimes committed by those released—that they ended up treating 
arrestees more conservatively than the courts had.109 Eventually, the 
grant from the Ford Foundation ran dry and the project had to be taken 
up by the court system. Under the auspices of the court’s probation 
department, the project continued to reduce nonmonetary releases.110 
The program’s ultimate absorption by the court system led it to effect 
the exact opposite of the change it was hoping for; a program that was 
instituted to increase pretrial release ended up substantially reducing 
it.111 Other less well-funded reform efforts around the state faced 
similar challenges and produced similar results.112 
After a decade of reform attempts, not much had changed. Indeed, 
in 1979, more than a decade after the legislature revised the California 
Constitution to include an on-recognizance provision, Governor Jerry 
Brown (in his first incarnation) declared that further reform was 
necessary.113 
However, in response to rapidly elevating crime rates, public 
opinion in California turned against the rights of pretrial defendants in 
 
 106. Id. at 41. In the late 1970s, Los Angeles County had a pretrial release budget that was 
equal to half of Brooklyn’s, and San Francisco had a pretrial release budget of $200,000—slightly 
more than Staten Island’s. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 43. 
 110. THOMAS, supra note 96, at 130. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 121–22 (noting that, despite initial successes, the San Francisco bail project 
needed to claw tooth and nail to stay funded); see also FEELEY, supra note 105, at 44 (describing 
how, though the San Francisco bail project survived, it “operated out of a cubbyhole” and “was a 
shoestring operation” that “kept its records on three-by-five cards filed in old shoeboxes,” but,  
nonetheless, produced similar results to the much better-funded Oakland project). 
 113. Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., State of the State Address (Jan. 16, 1979). 
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the early 1980s.114 In 1982, voters passed two propositions—
Proposition 4, which revised article 1, section 12 of the California 
Constitution to explicitly allow courts to consider public safety in 
setting bail,115 and Proposition 8, known as the “Victim’s Bill of 
Rights,” which proposed repealing section 12 completely, replacing it 
with a stricter system of bail and pretrial release.116 Though 
Proposition 8’s pretrial provisions did not ultimately go into effect, the 
fact that they were passed shows how public sentiment turned against 
pretrial defendants.117 
California’s counter-reform movement had an even starker effect 
on pretrial detention rates than did the United States as a whole. 
California now detains 59 percent of felony defendants before trial, 
compared to a nationwide average rate of 32 percent.118 Increased 
detention has not led to productive results; rates of pretrial misconduct 
are generally higher in California than they are elsewhere.119 The issue 
is exacerbated in California by the mandatory use of bail schedules, 
which courts tend to use presumptively to set bail amounts in ways 
that might violate both the United States and California 
Constitutions.120 As a result, the median bail in California is five times 
 
 114. See, e.g., David Yamamoto, The Problems Facing California’s New Bail Standard, 5 
GLENDALE L. REV. 203, 203 (1983) (asserting that “a major concern in today’s society is the 
inadequacy of our traditional bail standard to deal realistically with the dangerous and violent 
crimes committed by persons released on bail”). 
 115. People v. Standish, 135 P.3d 32, 41–42 (Cal. 2006) (“[Proposition 4] permitted courts 
setting bail to consider other factors other than the probability that a defendant would appear at 
trial. . . . [T]he proponents of the measure made it clear they intended that public safety should be 
a consideration in bail decisions.”). 
 116. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR 1982, PRIMARY 32–35 
(1982), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1917&context= 
ca_ballot_props. Note that California was ahead of the curve in effecting counter-reform; the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 was still two years away. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 117. See In re York, 892 P.2d 804, 807 n.4 (Cal. 1995) (holding that, because Proposition 4 
received more votes than Proposition 8, its provisions prevailed over Proposition 8’s). But see PDR 
REPORT, supra note 103, at 23 n.63. In spite of the holding in In re York, voters passed the Victims’ 
Bill of Rights Act of 2008, which, without repealing article 1, section 12, reinserted the previously 
defunct bail provisions of 1982’s Proposition 8. Id. As of yet, no California court has interpreted 
how these two provisions work together. Id. 
 118. Tafoya, supra note 23. 
 119. TAFOYA ET AL., supra note 27, at 15. 
 120. See Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 173, 178 (based on an empirical survey of 
two California county court systems, finding that in both, “bail schedules are the main factor 
considered by judges at felony arraignments, . . . judges do not take into consideration an 
individual’s ability to pay, and . . . the schedules appear to operate presumptively, without any 
individualized determination”). 
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higher than it is in the rest of the country.121 A recent lawsuit filed on 
behalf of pretrial arrestees alleged that the California bail industry 
conspired to keep premiums high for defendants, thereby further 
worsening the problem.122 Over a two year period, California 
taxpayers spent $37.5 million in just six counties to house defendants 
whose cases were never filed or were dismissed.123 The numbers 
indicate that there is racial bias in judges’ pretrial release decisions as 
well; almost 50 percent of whites are released pretrial, compared to 
only 38 percent of Latinos and 34 percent of African-Americans.124 It 
is against this backdrop that California’s own “third wave” of bail 
reform rose. 
C.  SB 10 and the Third Wave of California Bail Reform 
The push for a new wave of bail reform in California has mirrored 
efforts in the rest of the country. Specifically, since 2012, California 
legislators and reformers have advocated for expanding pretrial 
release, whether that be through use of risk assessment algorithms or 
through an increase in book-and-release citations.125 
Though early-decade legislation was never able to make it 
through the legislature, the calls for bail reform caught the attention of 
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye of the California Supreme Court. In 
her 2016 State of the Judiciary Address, she instructed legislators that 
they could not continue to ignore the problems caused by cash bail.126 
She then established the Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup to 
evaluate the current bail system and make recommendations for 
improvement.127 The workgroup’s report found that “California’s 
 
 121. It’s Time to Do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, supra note 28. 
 122. Jazmine Ulloa, Bail Companies in California Have Conspired to Keep Premiums High, 
Lawsuit Alleges, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-
california-bail-surety-lawsuit-20190129-story.html. 
 123. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 3. 
 124. TAFOYA ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (noting that further study of these statistics is required, 
as the disparity might be caused by differences in offenses, booking status, and the month/county 
of booking). 
 125. See PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 98–99 (Proposals to increase on-recognizance release 
based on risk assessment included Senate Bill 210 (Hancock, 2012), Senate Bill 1180 (Hancock, 
2012), and Senate Bill 210 (Hancock, 2014); all three stalled in the legislature.); see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 104 (arguing that California should adopt an expansive use of 
simple book-and-release with citations). 
 126. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cal., 2016 State of the Judiciary 
Address (Mar. 8, 2016). 
 127. PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 5. 
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current pretrial release and detention system unnecessarily 
compromises victim and public safety because it bases a person’s 
liberty on financial resources rather than the likelihood of future 
criminal behavior and exacerbates socioeconomic disparities and 
racial bias.”128 The workgroup then recommended widespread 
implementation of risk assessment procedures as a fix.129 
The legislature responded with SB 10, the California Money Bail 
Reform Act of 2017.130 The bill, introduced by Senator Hertzberg and 
co-sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), had the 
stated intent of “safely reducing the number of people detained 
pretrial, while addressing racial and economic disparities in the 
pretrial system.”131 As originally written, the bill would create a 
presumption of release for most defendants, subject to a risk 
assessment132 conducted by a tool that would be implemented state-
wide.133 The only defendants that could be held were those who: (1) 
had committed capital crimes; and (2) had committed felony offenses 
for which the presumption of guilt was great and there was a 
substantial likelihood—as determined by either the risk assessment 
tool or the judge—that the persons’ release would result in harm to 
another.134 
An outpouring of opposition came from law enforcement 
interests, bail bondsmen, and the Judicial Council.135 Chief Justice 
 
 128. Id. at 1. 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. S. B. 10 § 2, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). There are also currently several 
cases pending before federal courts and the California Supreme Court regarding defendants’ rights 
to pretrial release. See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018); Third Amended 
Class Action Complaint, Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 4:15-CV-04959 (N.D. Cal. 
May 27, 2016); Amended Class Action Complaint, Welchen v. County of Sacramento, 343 F. Supp. 
3d 924 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 2:16-CV-00185). 
 131. S.B. 10 § 2, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 132. Risk assessment tools are computer programs that use historical data to predict how likely 
someone is to commit a crime or fail to appear at trial in the future. The prediction is generated by 
analyzing factors such as “age, gender, criminal record, employment status, education level, etc.,” 
and then identifying how closely those factors have correlated to a defendant who commits crime 
or fails to appear. See Stevenson, supra note 80, at 304. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, supra note 
30, at 12–13. 
 135. Id. at 14–15 (centering opposition arguments around the risk to public safety that 
eliminating cash bail threatened); see also Taryn Luna, No California Bail Reform This Year, 
Governor Announces, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 25, 2017, 11:03 AM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article169364312.html (reporting 
stiff opposition to SB 10). 
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Cantil-Sakauye conceptually agreed with the bill but thought that it 
“[did] not establish a reasonable or realistic balance” between concern 
for public safety and administrative concerns.136 She was particularly 
worried that the bill eliminated judicial discretion, placing too much 
power in the hands of the pretrial services agency that made the risk 
assessment.137 
After a year of negotiations, the legislature revealed a new version 
of the bill on August 20, 2018. Lawmakers had substantially revised 
the bill without the input of community representatives or advocacy 
groups and had widely expanded the preventive detention 
possibilities.138 Gone was the intent to “safely reduce the number of 
people detained pretrial”; it had been replaced with an intent to “permit 
preventive detention of pretrial defendants.”139 No longer was there a 
broad presumption in favor of pretrial release; judges now had wide 
discretion to detain.140 There was an expansive list of enumerated 
offenses that precluded a defendant from pretrial release, and the 
revised bill allowed for local courts to create as many exceptions as 
they deemed necessary.141 The bill also allowed the local judiciary 
 
 136. Alexei Koseff, Ending Bail Worries California Judges, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 11, 2017, 
6:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article160636989.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Jasmine Tyler & John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Urges Governor Brown of 
California to Veto Senate Bill 10, The California Bail Reform Act, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 24, 
2018, 12:16 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/24/human-rights-watch-urges-governor-
brown-california-veto-senate-bill-10-california#_ftnref8. 
 139. S.B. 10 § 1, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 140. See S.B. 10 § 1320.18(d), 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“If the court 
determines there is a substantial likelihood that no nonmonetary condition or combination of 
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at the 
preventive detention hearing or reasonably assure public safety prior to the preventive detention 
hearing, the court may detain the defendant pending a preventive detention hearing, and shall state 
the reasons for detention on the record.”). 
 141. S.B. 10 § 1320.10, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (defining offenses that 
automatically preclude pretrial release to include: (1) persons assessed as high risk by the risk 
assessment tool; (2) persons arrested for certain sex crimes; (3) persons arrested for domestic 
violence; (4) persons arrested for stalking; (5) persons arrested for violent felonies; (6) persons 
arrested for their third DUI in the last ten years; (7) persons who have violated any type of 
restraining order in the last five years; (8) persons who have three or more failures to appear in the 
last twelve months; (9) persons who already have a pending trial or sentencing for a misdemeanor 
or felony; (10) persons who are under any form of postconviction supervision other than informal 
court supervision; (11) persons who have intimidated a witness or victim of the current crime; (12) 
persons who have violated a condition of release within the last five years; and (13) persons who 
have been convicted of a violent or serious felony within the past five years); see also id. § 1320.11 
(“The local rule may further expand the list of offenses and factors for which prearraignment release 
of persons assessed as medium risk is not permitted . . . .”). 
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unfettered discretion in implementing risk assessment analysis, 
allowing them to expand the pool of those ineligible for release nearly 
at will.142 Though the revised bill was met with vociferous complaints 
from the human rights groups that had previously supported it,143 
Governor Brown quickly signed it into law on August 28, 2018.144 SB 
10 originally was to take effect in October 2019, but a concerted push 
from the bail industry gathered over 500,000 signatures—far more 
than the 200,000 required—in support of a voter referendum on the 
law.145 As a result, the future of SB 10 lies with California voters, who 
will decide whether the law takes effect in November 2020. 
III.  WHY DO CRIMINAL REFORMS FAIL AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN 
FROM THAT FAILURE? 
The pattern of criminal justice reform is similar to a scene from 
the movie Bartleby.146 In that scene, an office manager in his boredom 
winds up a toy rabbit, which then jumps up and down.147 The man is 
surprised, picks the rabbit back up, and winds it again.148 Much to his 
shock, it once again jumps.149 The pattern repeats itself over and 
over.150 Criminal justice reformers are not so different from the bored 
office manager.151 They attempt the same—or substantially similar—
reforms over and over again, expressing the same shock the office 
manager does when those reforms don’t succeed as planned—or 
simply outright fail.152 Why is this? Why, despite repeated failure in 
the criminal reform process, can’t reformers do any better? 
 
 142. See id. § 1320.24. 
 143. See Tyler & Raphling, supra note 138; see also Daisy Vieyra, ACLU of California 
Statement: Governor Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Opposed by ACLU, AM. C.L. UNION 
SO. CAL. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-statement-
governor-brown-signs-bail-reform-legislation-opposed-aclu (arguing against the new iteration of 
SB 10). 
 144. Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Revamp California’s Bail System, Protect Public 
Safety, OFF. GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR. (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2018/08/28/governor-brown-signs-legislation-to-revamp-
californias-bail-system-protect-public-safety/index.html. 
 145. McGough, supra note 31. 
 146. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational 
Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 
246, 246 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Napatoff eds. 2017). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
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The simple answer is that criminal reformers have traditionally 
ignored the lessons of history. Often high-minded idealists, reformers 
tend to approach their projects as if the problem and solution are 
unprecedented.153 They operate as crisis thinkers, initiating bold 
crusades that purport to offer bold, simple solutions to complex 
problems.154 Because reformers tend to oversimplify the problems 
they face, expectations are set too high.155 Those high expectations are 
nearly always dashed, however, because idealistic reformers are not 
the only force at play in criminal reform. The history of criminal 
justice reform shows a pattern of competing forces, which often tend 
to be ignored by those idealists who hope to enact meaningful 
change.156 
The first force is that of the moral idealist, who posits an idea for 
reform based on her view of an ideal society and supports her idea 
with values of “rightness or goodness.”157 The moral idealist will often 
sell her idea with broad, simple claims, since, practically, that is the 
only way to garner public support for the movement.158 This initial 
force can be seen in every attempt at bail reform, throughout both the 
histories of the nation as a whole and California. Arthur Beeley, Caleb 
Foote, Herbert Sturz, and Louis Schweitzer all were appalled by the 
standard of pretrial detention in the early twentieth century and 
implemented crusades to fix it.159 The Ford Foundation’s funding of 
the pretrial services agency in Oakland was similarly high-minded.160 
That call for reform is quickly met by the second force: those who 
represent society’s need for order.161 Whereas the idealist typically 
approaches her ideas with the welfare of the accused in mind, those 
who represent the need for order respond with society’s need to 
suppress crime.162 Indeed, a reform typically will not win general 
acceptance until it promises to more effectively punish criminals in a 
 
 153. See Feeley, supra note 22, at 677. 
 154. See id. at 683. 
 155. GREG BERMAN & AUBREY FOX, TRIAL AND ERROR IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: 
LEARNING FROM FAILURE 115–16, 118 (2010). 
 156. Samuel Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 80 NW. U. J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 728 (1989). 
 157. Id. at 726–27. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Feeley, supra note 22, at 682–83. 
 160. See FEELEY, supra note 105, at 41. 
 161. Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 727. 
 162. Id. 
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way that satisfies society’s need for retribution.163 While occasionally 
the two forces—idealist and reactionary—can work in harmony, with 
a new reform purporting to allow for both more justice and more order, 
the interests of the idealist tend to lose out once the reform is actually 
implemented.164 
The starkest example of this reactionary force in modern bail 
reform is the counter-reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s that 
culminated with the Bail Reform Act of 1984.165 The public blamed 
rising crime rates on an overly liberal system of pretrial release, and 
tough-on-crime government actors responded by explicitly 
authorizing courts to preventively detain arrestees who were deemed 
unsafe.166 At first, it seemed as if the two ideals might be able to 
coexist; Salerno instructed courts to treat pretrial release as the norm, 
with arrestees only detained if they truly were a public safety threat.167 
As seen above, however, the hopes of the idealists—to liberalize 
pretrial release such that far fewer arrestees were detained—were 
dashed, with the counter-reform resulting in skyrocketing detention 
rates that have endured to this day.168 
The third, final, and perhaps most powerful force is that of the 
criminal justice institution itself: the judges, prosecutors, defenders, 
and probation officers that must implement any new system of 
reform.169 Above all, these actors are interested in efficiency. Since 
they are the ones ultimately responsible for implementing reforms, 
their interests tend to override all others, and they often end up 
“capturing” the reform for their own purposes.170 The criminal justice 
system is also fragmented by design, with the actors that make up the 
system pitted against each other in an adversarial scheme.171 Because 
the system is so complex and disorganized, everyone has their own 
motivations and nobody has control.172 These differing motivations 
are fueled by conflicts in values; some judges believe that the purpose 
of imprisonment is to rehabilitate, while others believe it is to 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra, Part II(A). 
 166. Id. 
 167. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 168. See supra, Part II(A). 
 169. Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 727. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Feeley, supra note 22, at 703. 
 172. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 324. 
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punish.173 The criminal court system has been compared to a leaky 
hose: “You can turn the pressure up at one end, but this . . . does not 
pump out more water at the other. More pressure simply means more 
leaks.”174 
The history of bail reform is rife with examples of this third 
force’s influence as well. For example, one need only look at how 
pretrial detention rose immediately once the independently funded 
pretrial service in Oakland was absorbed by the local probation 
department.175 Or at the way current California courts implement 
statutory instructions to individually determine every arrestee’s 
situation before setting bail.176 In short, they completely ignore 
them.177 California courts are not alone in this; as early as 1974, 
scholars were lamenting how courts nationwide completely ignored 
reform-based instructions to liberalize pretrial release.178 
SB 10, and California bail reform in general, is already being 
buffeted by the first two forces of reform. The first was represented on 
several fronts; human rights groups have been calling for a 
liberalization of bail for years.179 In early 2018, a California Court of 
Appeal declared the standardized use of bail schedules 
unconstitutional and called on the legislature to implement reforms.180 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye called for broad bail reform in her 2016 
State of the Judiciary Address.181 The second force is represented by 
California’s law-and-order types. The most vehement representative 
of this front is the bail bond lobby, as they fight to protect both public 
safety and their imminent extinction should SB 10 be enacted.182 After 
SB 10 passed, the bail lobby flexed its muscle, quickly collecting 
 
 173. See generally JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 15 (1971) (describing 
this clash of values). 
 174. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 324. 
 175. See supra, Part II(B). 
 176. See Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 168. 
 177. Id. 
 178. PAUL B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 156 
(1974) (“[S]tatutes clearly order judges to inquire as to the facts of the crime, the background of 
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to the determination of bail. In courtroom after courtroom these statutory provisions were forgotten. 
In Chicago, which is controlled by the progressive and comprehensive Illinois Bail Reform Act, 
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 179. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83. 
 180. In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 545 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 181. Cantil-Sakauye, supra note 126. 
 182. Blanca Garcia, Bail Industry Fights SB 10, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Oct. 11, 2018, 12:00 
AM), https://www.independent.com/news/2018/oct/11/bail-industry-fights-sb-10. 
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enough signatures to force a November 2020 voter referendum on SB 
10.183 A final powerful group fighting against SB 10 are victims’ rights 
advocates, who, like the other retributive interests, fear that more 
liberalized pretrial release will lead to unsafe citizens and harm 
victims’ interests in seeing those who have harmed them safely 
detained.184 
That leaves the third force; that of the criminal justice institutions. 
These interests have not been silent thus far. The Judicial Council was 
heavily involved in rewriting the relatively liberal original version of 
SB 10.185 After the council’s involvement, SB 10 allowed for a much 
larger use of judicial discretion and seemed to set the stage for 
potentially limitless preventive detentions.186 The full effect of the 
changes is yet to be seen. 
This Note seeks to: (1) examine the ultimate influence that 
criminal justice actors might wield on SB 10; and (2) how to expect 
and account for it. As seen above, criminal reforms suffer from an 
unfortunate pattern, one that involves failing to learn from past 
mistakes—and being unable to anticipate future failures. California 
has already seen the first and second forces—the idealists and the 
reactionaries—clash over bail reform. Should SB 10 pass the 2020 
referendum, however, its ultimate fate lies with the court system. 
Therefore, by examining the motivations of criminal court actors, this 
Note hopes to head off some of the mistakes of the past by allowing 
reformers to anticipate the difficulties of implementation, understand 
the motivations of and influences on employees of the court system, 
and set a reasonable—if perhaps disappointingly tempered—standard 
for what a successful SB 10 looks like in the future. 
IV.  THE COURT SYSTEM: MOTIVATIONS AND INFLUENCES 
At the outset, it is important to examine the motivations of the 
court system as a whole. There are certain aspects of the system that 
tend to discourage innovation.187 First, because courts see a very high 
volume of cases, there is a need within the system for established 
 
 183. McGough, supra note 31. 
 184. Klaas, supra note 84. 
 185. Supra, Part II(C). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See JERALD HAGE & MICHAEL AIKEN, SOCIAL CHANGE IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 
100 (1970). 
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routines and rules that support those routines.188 Court actors become 
comfortable with those routines and rules and are hesitant (if not 
outright hostile) to changes.189 Second, courts have many segmented 
pieces—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys—which discourage 
system-wide innovative thinking. Because this segmentation is also 
inherently adversarial, court actors distrust each other and can often 
be antagonistic.190 Finally, courts must emphasize efficiency in their 
operations so as not to collapse under the weight of their caseloads, 
which leads actors system-wide to stereotype cases and use informal 
practices to process cases as quickly as possible.191 Any change 
threatens to disrupt the typical, efficient manner of business, and thus 
is heavily resisted.192 
Understanding that courts tend to value efficiency and routine, 
however, does not entirely get to the root of the issue. It is also 
important to understand what motivates the different actors within the 
court system, and how that motivation influences their actions. 
A.  Judges 
It only seems natural to begin by examining the interests of the 
central figures of the criminal court system: the judges. After all, it 
will be up to judges to implement and routinize the new pretrial 
services systems that SB 10 calls for. What has happened in the past 
when judges have been statutorily instructed to liberalize pretrial 
detention, sentencing, or parole? Why have judges reacted to those 
reforms in the way they did? By teasing these answers out, perhaps it 
is possible to predict with some accuracy how California judges might 
implement SB 10. 
There are many examples in California’s history of judges 
undercutting reforms and reducing their hoped-for effects. In 1878, the 
Goodwin Act purported to liberalize “good time” credit for prisoners, 
allowing prisoners to go free earlier than they previously had been able 
to.193 In the years after the Goodwin Act was implemented, judges in 
Alameda County increased the average felony sentence by up to 30 
percent, almost directly cancelling out the liberalizing effect the 
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legislature had hoped to enact.194 California enacted parole in 1893, 
which resulted in judges doling out sentences that were two and a half 
years longer than they were before the parole law.195 It seems that early 
California judges were compensating for the new laws to ensure that 
prisoners would serve the same amount of time as they had before.196 
Judges did not react any more favorably to the bail reforms of the 
1960s. Though there is less evidence of the outright counterbalancing 
observed above, there is plenty of evidence of judges ignoring clear 
statutory instructions either due to personal bias or to promote 
efficiency.197 As previously discussed, the bail reform efforts of the 
1960s tried to promulgate pretrial release based on individualized 
factors for each defendant. Many bail reform statutes directly 
instructed judges to consider the individual situation of each 
defendant.198 A 1974 study of judicial activity with regards to bail, 
however, found that judges often ignored these instructions due to 
large caseloads.199 They also ignored them due to an apparent distrust, 
dislike, and cynicism towards arrestees who appeared in their 
courtrooms.200 Finally, judges viewed factors such as the seriousness 
of the offense and the arrestee’s prior criminal history as far more 
dispositive for setting bail than such “ephemeral” elements as the 
arrestee’s ties to the community or his ability to pay.201 
A final pertinent example comes from a study of San Diego area 
courts in the late 1970s. One finding that stood out was that judges 
were remarkably individualistic; they would not brook another judge 
interfering with their authority over their own courtrooms, even if it 
was the presiding judge.202 This led to a type of “friendly anarchy” 
within the court, where each judge handled his courtroom in his own 
 
 194. Id. at 215–16. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 216. 
 197. FEELEY, supra note 105, at 125 (“A great many judges quite simply do not regard 
liberalized pretrial release as desirable.”). 
 198. See WICE, supra note 178, at 156. 
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 200. Id. at 31 (describing how, in the words of one judge, defendants could not be trusted to 
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way.203 Any proposal to give the presiding judge more managing 
power, even a proposal that seemed likely to improve the court’s 
efficiency, was met with immediate suspicion and usually rejected.204 
Another element of interest from the San Diego court study was 
how judges were controlled by the use of peremptory challenges205 by 
prosecutors.206 The peremptory challenge is a procedural tool that may 
be used by any party if they are unhappy with the judge assigned to 
their case, and is usable “without any further act or proof.”207 The 
district attorney in San Diego would use the peremptory as a weapon 
against judges who were too lenient in sentencing.208 One district 
attorney even found a way of ensuring that his cases were never heard 
(even initially) by a judge he found too liberal; he made clear that he 
was prepared to challenge this particular judge every time his case was 
assigned.209 The tactic worked, and the judge was assigned almost no 
criminal overflow work.210 
Modern studies provide further information on judicial 
motivations and demonstrate that these motivations have not seriously 
changed since the cited historical studies. Efficiency remains 
paramount—a study of bail proceedings in Southern California in 
2018 found that bail hearings were short or nonexistent, with one 
judge describing the hearings as “Costco justice.”211 Just as the 1970s 
study found, modern judges tend to err on the side of pretrial detention, 
directly contravening the text of state constitutions or statutes that 
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require a presumption of release.212 This is because judges tend to be 
extremely wary of being blamed for crimes committed by those 
released pretrial; wrongful decisions to detain contain no such harmful 
possibilities for the judge.213 This pressure is particularly powerful in 
states such as California where judges are subject to reelection after 
their initial appointment.214 
Of great interest for the purposes of SB 10 is that judges, even 
when presented with the possibility of relying on an actuarial risk tool 
to guide discretion, tend to detain far more defendants than is 
necessary to constrain dangerousness.215 In fact, most judges seem to 
think that their assessments are more accurate than that of a risk 
assessment tool.216 Studies suggest that, if that discretion was 
removed, a larger proportion of defendants would be released while 
pretrial violent crime rates would decrease.217 However, because 
judges are not responsible for increased jail budgets and taxes that 
come along with increased rates of pretrial detention, they have no 
incentive to follow liberalized pretrial detention reforms—and, as 
described above, have every incentive to over-detain.218 
To summarize: judges, both in general and in California, tend to 
be wary of those who tread upon their discretion, whether it be a 
legislator or another judge. When legislatures enact reforms, judges 
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tend to ignore any statutory requirements that encourage (or mandate) 
liberal policies, instead either staying with practices that they are 
comfortable with or making punishments more draconian, as seen in 
the Alameda County courts in the late nineteenth century. Judges also 
seem to be influenced by the possibility of public scorn and the 
prosecutorial Sword of Damocles that is the peremptory challenge; 
both of these factors tend to impel judges towards conservative 
detention practices. Finally, efficiency is paramount. If a reform 
threatens to clog a judge’s courtroom even worse than it already is, the 
judge is likely to reject it. 
B.  Prosecutors 
Judges are not the only powerful force within the court system. 
Prosecutors hold just as much (and, in some situations, more) sway as 
judges do.219 Prosecutors play an outsized role in determining an 
arrestee’s release pretrial, since they have relatively unchecked 
discretion to decide whether to charge an arrestee.220 Judges will 
typically defer to the bail recommendation that the prosecutor makes 
(even if it deviates from the schedule).221 Under the current SB 10, this 
would most likely continue because there are several provisions that 
allow prosecutors to file a motion requesting that an arrestee be 
detained.222 Because prosecutors will continue to have such an 
outsized role in determining whether an arrestee is detained pretrial, it 
is as important to examine their motivations and practices as it is to 
look at judges’. 
As far back as the late nineteenth century, judges have tended to 
make bail decisions according to prosecutorial recommendations.223 
By the 1970s, not much had changed; most public officials believed 
that prosecutors had a large role in determining how bail was set, with 
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their recommendations having a strong—usually dispositive—
influence on the judge’s decision.224 
As described above, prosecutors in California also can wield a 
large amount of influence by using their peremptory challenge on 
judges who they deem to be lenient setters of bail.225 They also can 
strategically overcharge, filing charges at the highest level that the 
facts will support in the anticipation that the defendant will plea down 
to a lesser charge.226 In many ways, they have nearly complete control 
of the initial aspects of the criminal case; it is no wonder they are 
considered “the sentr[ies] at the gate of the criminal court system.”227 
Prosecutorial motivations are not overly complex. Like many 
judges, they are elected officials. Unlike judges, however, they are 
seen as the protectors of the public interest “in an aspect of human 
society that arouses people’s fear and outrage.”228 Though prosecutors 
have an interest in the efficiency of the court, their other interests 
outweigh it. As elected officials, they are hyper-aware of their image 
in the community, and therefore they tend to “attempt to accommodate 
the political demands of an electorate that tends to be vindictive 
toward the malefactor.”229 
Prosecutors tend to have a certain professional ethic, one that 
embraces law enforcement values and requires a cultivated reputation 
of “utter credibility, inevitable truth, almost of invincibility.”230 As 
such, prosecutors are loath to demonstrate lenience, and often will 
charge accordingly.231 Though the practice is not universal, studies 
have found that many prosecutors either overcharge or ask for high 
bail to ensure that a defendant will remain behind bars, since, as 
discussed above, a defendant who is detained pretrial is much more 
likely to plead guilty than one who is released.232 The nearly limitless 
discretion granted to prosecutors means that often, whether implicitly 
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or explicitly, their charging decisions are tinged with racial animus. A 
study of federal prosecutors recently found that they are twice as likely 
to charge black men with crimes that have a minimum sentence 
requirement as they are similarly situated white men, resulting in black 
men facing prison sentences that are 10 percent longer than similarly 
situated white men.233 
In sum, prosecutors have an immense amount of power in the 
criminal justice system, and the discretion to use that power as they 
see fit. As described above, they tend to adhere to a professional ethic 
that discourages any showing of lenience. Furthermore, as elected 
officials, they typically have every incentive to keep arrestees behind 
bars and secure as many guilty pleas as possible; conversely, they have 
very little incentive to put people they view as dangerous back out on 
the street. 
C.  Corrections Officers 
There are other actors within the criminal justice system that 
could affect SB 10’s implementation. Most important amongst these 
(for our purposes) are probation officers, as probation departments 
will have a significant role in implementing SB 10’s risk assessment 
programs. Though risk-assessment tools are intended to remove as 
much discretion as possible, that outcome depends on whether 
probation officers can reliably and consistently make correct arrestee 
classifications based on the tool’s recommendation. Studies on the 
reliability of risk-assessment implementation are few, but one recent 
study suggests that probation officers can reliably analyze the results 
given to them by the risk assessment tool—alleviating concerns that 
lower-level officers might misclassify whether an arrestee is low, 
medium, or high risk.234 
Close cases, however, will still require that a probation officer use 
his discretion to classify an arrestee. Studies show that probation 
officers (like other court actors) tend to err on the side of caution.235 
Another study suggests that there may be racial disparities in whether 
probation officers use their discretion in a manner consistent with 
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public interest; white officers tended to believe that they utilized their 
discretion to serve public interest, whereas African-American and 
female officers believed that discretionary decisions were instead 
based on personal preference.236 The study also indicates that an 
officer’s personal preference can be heavily influenced by social 
pressures both within and outside the agency: 43 percent of officers 
felt pressured to recommend incarceration or initiate formal judicial 
proceedings in situations where they might otherwise not do so.237 
Thus, though it seems as if probation officers can reliably implement 
a risk-assessment tool, their discretionary judgment on close cases will 
still err towards recommending detention. 
Despite the effects probation officers could have on SB 10, the 
true agents of cooption are most likely to be judges and prosecutors, 
the most powerful actors within the criminal justice system. Now that 
the incentives behind these institutional figures have been analyzed, 
Part V will apply these lessons and examine how they have affected 
the implementation of modern bail reforms. 
V.  CURRENT BAIL REFORMS IN OTHER STATES: HOW HAVE COURT 
ACTOR MOTIVATIONS AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION? 
Current bail reform efforts in other states might serve as 
guideposts for the future of SB 10. New Jersey and Kentucky have 
installed systems that mostly replace cash bail with risk assessment 
analysis as a way of releasing more defendants pretrial—as SB 10 
purports to do—so it will be enlightening to analyze how system 
actors have reacted to these reforms. Have they followed the 
instructions of their legislatures, presuming that defendants should be 
released while detaining only the most dangerous? The answer, in 
short, is no. 
New Jersey passed the Criminal Justice Reform Act in 2014, 
requiring that the courts replace cash bail with a pretrial risk 
assessment system.238 Much like SB 10, the purpose of the reform is 
to ensure that defendants did not remain behind bars solely because of 
their inability to pay; detention is to be based on danger to society or 
the risk that they might not reappear for trial.239 The court system is 
 
 236. Id. at 10–11. 
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responsible for running the pretrial services program, as it most likely 
will be in California.240 The algorithm used by the pretrial services 
program is the Arnold Foundation’s Pretrial Services Assessment 
(PSA), which has become the standard across the country.241 The law 
went into effect in early 2017, and initial returns are promising.242 The 
number of defendants sitting in jail before their trial dropped by 19 
percent.243 However, the machinery that applies pressure to criminal 
justice reform has already begun to work. 
Soon after the implementation of this new system, a number of 
people who had been arrested on gun charges were released before 
trial. One man murdered someone mere days after his release, while 
another killed his ex-girlfriend and himself.244 In response to the 
resulting public outcry, the Judiciary Committee changed the inputs of 
its risk assessment tool, making a gun charge grounds for automatic 
recommendation of pretrial detention.245 Though the ACLU and New 
Jersey Public Defender’s Office opposed this, arguing that the change 
was an overreaction to anecdotal rather than empirical evidence, the 
courts were quick to follow the recommendation.246 It is not difficult 
to foresee the courts reacting to further high profile (but anecdotal) 
crime committed by those released before trial, thus reversing the 
positive gains made in the initial months of New Jersey’s bail law.247 
In fact, other states’ experience with bail reform demonstrates that it 
is foolish to read too much significance into positive short-term trends 
that immediately follow reform. All too often, those trends normalize, 
and the levels of pretrial detention return to the pre-reform status-quo. 
Kentucky’s experience with bail reform is instructive here. In 
2011, the state passed House Bill 463 (HB 463), which mandated that 
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each judge consider the determination of a risk assessment tool before 
making their pretrial detention decision.248 The stated goal of the law, 
similar to SB 10, is to reduce incarceration rates while allowing for 
preventive detention of the dangerous.249 Like SB 10, it directed that 
all low risk defendants and most medium-risk defendants (as 
identified by the assessment) be released without cash bail; it also did 
not order judges to follow the recommendation all the time, just to 
consider it.250 The risk assessment tool used, as in New Jersey, was 
the PSA.251 A study showed that, while there were promising initial 
results (as in New Jersey), those results quickly normalized. Six years 
after HB 463 was enacted, Kentucky’s pretrial release rates are lower 
than they were before the bill and lower than the national average.252 
It is believed that this has much to do with the discretion granted to 
judges in Kentucky law. According to a study, judges ignored the 
presumption of release and the recommendation of the tool in more 
than two-thirds of all cases.253 They exercised their discretion not to 
correct the risk assessment if it was wrong but to override it when it 
was correct.254 
This is not to say that Kentucky’s experience forecasts doom for 
New Jersey, California, and other jurisdictions that attempt to make 
the switch from cash bail to risk assessment systems. Though the 
overall release rate decreased in Kentucky, judges did grant non-
monetary release for low-risk defendants 63 percent more than they 
had before HB 463.255 Since one of the biggest injustices of the cash 
bail system is that low-risk defendants remain in jail for no reason 
other than that they cannot afford to get out, this represents a 
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significant improvement.256 In addition, though many fear that risk 
assessment tools will exacerbate racial disparities in pretrial detention 
decisions, the study shows that, according to initial returns, racial 
disparities remained the same.257 While the fact that the 
implementation of risk assessment in Kentucky did not reduce racial 
disparities might disappoint, it is encouraging that it did not make 
things worse. Finally, the court system in Kentucky has shown itself 
willing to examine the results of its system and tinker with it if 
necessary.258 In light of lowered release rates, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court ordered that all defendants rated low and medium risks and 
charged with low-level crimes are to be automatically released on 
bail—thus removing discretion from the equation.259 The order is too 
recent to determine the results, but the Kentucky judiciary’s 
willingness to self-evaluate and liberalize when necessary is 
encouraging. 
In sum, current third wave bail reform efforts show that, despite 
promising initial returns, bail reform laws very similar to SB 10 have 
not achieved all that reformers have hoped for. They tend to result in 
a brief change in pretrial release numbers, which then normalize over 
a period of years once judges begin exercising their discretion and 
returning to old practices. 
VI.  SB 10: WHAT TO EXPECT, HOW TO FIX POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, 
AND WHAT SUCCESS MIGHT LOOK LIKE 
In light of all this, what can we expect of SB 10? Court actors 
have already influenced the bill to grant themselves more power and 
discretion.260 Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye lobbied against the original 
version of the bill, arguing that it gave too much discretion to pretrial 
services agencies rather than judges, that the statute tried to dictate the 
factors for pretrial release when that should be the purview of judges, 
and that the statute imposed too much of a burden on judges who 
departed from the risk assessment recommendation.261 As seen below, 
her concerns were reflected in the rewritten version of the bill. 
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The final version of SB 10 purports to set up a program much like 
other risk assessment systems. The Judicial Council will promulgate 
rules on how to organize the pretrial services agency and the risk 
assessment tool—including how to classify “low,” “medium,” or 
“high” risk arrestees.262 The local court systems are entrusted with 
implementing the system.263 On the face of the bill’s text, it would 
appear that nearly all “low” and “medium” risk arrestees are likely to 
be released.264 
However, a number of sections in the bill greatly expand judicial 
discretion. Other sections enumerate many types of arrestees who may 
not be released. None of these sections were present in the original 
bill. 
First, the statute and suggested Judicial Council Rules of Court 
give wide discretion to local courts to expand the list of offenders 
classified as “medium-risk,” and thus subject to detention or harsher 
conditions of release.265 Though the bill warns that courts “shall not 
provide for the exclusion of release of all medium-risk defendants,” it 
still gives local courts nearly unfettered discretion to detain, so long as 
they do not detain “all medium-risk defendants.”266 The bill also 
allows wide judicial and prosecutorial discretion to detain even low-
risk defendants.267 At any time, a prosecutor may file a motion to 
detain the arrestee so long as the arrestee is on any form of post-
conviction supervision other than probation, is subject to a pending 
trial on another charge (no matter how minor), or—in a remarkably 
vague provision—“there is substantial reason to believe that no . . . 
condition . . . will reasonably assure protection of the public . . . or 
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appearance of the defendant in court as required.”268 Once the 
prosecutor files this motion, the judge may detain so long as the 
reasons are stated on the record.269 
SB 10, as passed in the legislature, looks remarkably similar to 
the current bail reform laws analyzed above. It has the same catch-all 
provision for prosecutors that New Jersey’s reform law has, allowing 
prosecutors to bypass the assessment recommendation and move for 
detention based on “substantial reasons” to believe that an arrestee 
might flee or pose a danger.270 It mandates that judges incorporate the 
recommendation of the risk assessment tool in to their decision, but 
then gives discretion to ignore it, as in Kentucky’s law.271 New Jersey 
courts reacted swiftly to two high-profile crimes committed by those 
released on gun crimes; SB 10’s provision that allows local courts to 
add, without serious limits, offenses in to the “medium-risk” category 
seems to set up California courts to do the same.272 
The Judicial Council’s influence on the rewritten bill sets courts 
up to repeat the patterns of past and current reforms. As discussed 
above, judges do not like having their traditional authority limited, be 
it by legislatures, other judges, or independent agencies.273 They trust 
their own judgment more than they trust algorithms.274 There can be a 
tendency, whether realized or not, to mistrust arrestees, assuming that 
anyone enmeshed in the criminal justice system deserves to be 
there.275 Prosecutors, because of their political and ethical mandates, 
will do all they can to keep arrestees behind bars.276 This is 
demonstrated by historical patterns, including recent history in both 
Kentucky and New Jersey. 
Is there a solution? The short answer might be disappointing. 
There is probably not a solution that would fully satisfy idealistic 
reformers. However, this does not mean that California’s bail reform 
is destined to be a failure. It merely means that reformers should work 
with criminal court actors to try and implement SB 10 in a way that 
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comports as closely as possible to the law’s spirit. The best-case 
scenario for criminal reformers is to focus on the “optimal, as opposed 
to the maximal, solution.”277 This means bridging the ideological 
divide and compromising with those who might oppose the reformers’ 
views. Despite decrying the rewritten (and ultimately passed) version 
of SB 10, the ACLU pledged to continue working with the bill’s 
sponsor, Senator Hertzberg, to work towards truly liberalized pretrial 
detention that also reduces racial biases. What might that legislation 
look like? 
Several scholars have suggested that the only way a risk 
assessment-based system will truly work is if judicial discretion is 
severely limited. The study of the Kentucky pretrial system posited 
that, in light of how quickly Kentucky judges used their discretion to 
ignore the risk assessment’s recommendations, a risk assessment 
system would not work as intended unless the legislature severely 
restricted a judge’s ability to depart from the recommendation.278 
Another scholar recommends that, in order to optimize the liberalizing 
effects of a risk assessment system, subjective discretion should be 
minimal.279 Yet another goes a step further, saying that judges should 
be subject to mandatory bail guidelines.280 
The opposing viewpoint is that, as described below, risk 
assessment algorithms are far from perfect. In fact, if the algorithms 
are built with historical data (as they inevitably must be), they will be 
inherently biased against groups that have been over-incarcerated; 
primarily, minorities and the poor.281 By allowing judges to retain 
most of their discretion, arrestees who may have fallen victim to a 
faulty risk analysis could be saved from detention by a lenient judge. 
Either way, arguments for limiting judicial discretion are almost 
certainly moot; it is simply unrealistic to expect that the Judicial 
Council—or local judges—would accept such a restraint on their 
discretion. Indeed, the original draft of SB 10 recommended very 
limited controls on discretion (such as requiring judges to make 
written reports as to why they had departed from the risk assessment 
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recommendation) which were resoundingly shot down by the Judicial 
Council.282 Even if they had not, the history examined in this Note 
points to legislative controls over the judiciary not having very much 
practical effect; court actors would find a loophole to exploit. 
With legislative controls over the judiciary out of the picture, 
perhaps the legislature could restrict prosecutorial power? For the 
same reasons described above, it is unlikely that the legislature would 
walk back SB 10’s provision allowing prosecutors to file a motion for 
pretrial detention at will. However, perhaps reformers could 
encourage the legislature to look to New Jersey as inspiration for a 
different type of prosecutorial control; in order to better control 
sentencing in drug cases, the New Jersey Attorney General instituted 
the Brimage guidelines.283 In short, the guidelines provide a range of 
sentences a prosecutor can offer during the plea process, prompting 
her to pick a specific offense to charge, how many offenses to charge, 
and how many prior crimes to invoke.284 This prevents a prosecutor 
from threatening an arrestee with the mandatory maximum as 
leverage.285 Without this negotiating tool, perhaps prosecutors might 
be more reasonable in their charging patterns. Because one of the 
weightier factors in the risk assessment tool is the severity of the 
charged crime, this might result in fewer arrestees detained pretrial. 
New Jersey instituted the Brimage guidelines, however, in 
response to a ruling by the New Jersey Supreme Court.286 Considering 
how politically driven and crime-control oriented prosecutors are, it 
seems doubtful that they would allow the legislature, as opposed to a 
court, to introduce this kind of discretionary control without a pitched 
battle. And seeing how the interests of court actors were able to so 
substantially influence the ultimate version of SB 10, it is eminently 
possible that they would win this battle as well. 
So where does that leave California’s current iteration of bail 
reform? It seems the likeliest avenues for compromise and success are 
two-fold. One is for reform-minded legislators to shift their focus to 
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the risk assessment tool itself. Many scholars worry that risk 
assessment tools will exacerbate race-based detention disparities, 
since the data used to generate recommendations will necessarily be 
old data, tainted by the systemic racism baked into the criminal justice 
system.287 Worse, risk assessment tools tend to operate as a black box, 
with those subject to their recommendations unable to understand why 
the tool recommended as it did.288 A recent case in Wisconsin, where 
a plaintiff made a due process challenge to the state’s risk assessment 
tool, highlighted the problem.289 Though the court rejected the due 
process claim, a concurrence stated: “[T]his court’s lack of 
understanding of [the risk assessment tool] was a significant problem 
in the instant case. At oral argument, the court repeatedly questioned 
both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about how [the tool] works. 
Few answers were available.”290 
Reformers in California should work to ensure that the risk 
assessment tool used does not operate as a black box that worsens pre-
existing racial disparities. The ACLU has already committed itself to 
this task.291 To succeed, it should ensure that, whichever risk 
assessment tool the Judicial Council opts to use, the public and press 
have the ability to analyze the tool for biased decision-making and 
problematic algorithms. Reformers should keep a close watch on this 
information and monitor it for warning signs. If the data shows that 
the risk assessment tool is failing to improve race-based detention 
disparities, reformers should work with the tool’s designers to remedy 
the problem. In that way, reformers could ensure that the tool, at the 
very least, is not making recommendations that will exacerbate the 
problems that money bail caused. Encouragingly, a bill sponsored by 
Senator Hertzberg that establishes “guidelines for data collection, 
transparency requirements, and regular validation of the tools” passed 
in the California Senate on April 25, 2019. 
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A second reasonable expectation for success would be to follow 
in Kentucky’s footsteps. Although, as described above, the bail reform 
experiment there has not been everything that idealists could have 
hoped for, there are signs that it has been a moderate success. First, 
there has been a 63 percent increase in the release of low-level 
offenders since the enactment of Kentucky’s bail reform law.292 
Second, there is evidence that the risk assessment tool did not 
exacerbate racial disparities (though it did not improve them either).293 
Finally, the most important lesson to take from Kentucky’s experience 
is that the state is taking steps to slowly but surely improve on the 
system. Studies of criminal justice reform explain that “failing to 
engage in self-reflection” is the number one mistake that reformers 
make, and that criminal justice officials “should constantly ask 
themselves what’s working, what isn’t, and why.”294 Kentucky seems 
to be constantly evaluating the success of its own reform efforts, 
something that happens all too rarely in criminal reform.295 The fact 
that the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that pretrial release rates 
were too low post-reform, acknowledged this was a problem, and 
promulgated rules to try and fix the problem is encouraging. 
SB 10 currently has a provision that provides for the Judicial 
Council to make reports to the California governor every year starting 
in 2021.296 Ensuring that this provision remains in the bill and is 
faithfully followed would be a good first step on the path to success. 
Reformers should also make sure to pressure the necessary actors so 
that the Judicial Council reacts appropriately to the data they receive, 
as the Kentucky Supreme Court did. If the Judicial Council and the 
legislature (with the help of activist reformers) continually monitor the 
new pretrial release program and revise it as necessary, SB 10 may 
well work to slowly improve California’s pretrial detention system. 
Since Senator Hertzberg is working with the ACLU to ensure that the 
law is implemented justly, perhaps reformers could encourage him and 
his colleagues to create a checklist of goals to be met; reduction in 
detention rate for low-level criminals, reduction of racial disparities in 
pretrial detention, and transparency in implementation would be a 
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good start. Such a checklist would allow reformers a tangible way of 
ensuring that both legislators and the Judicial Council fulfill their end 
of the bail reform bargain—and an easy way to hold them accountable 
to the public if they do not. 
Based on past patterns, it is clear that the idealists who push for 
bail reform are not going to get everything they wanted out of SB 10. 
In fact, if there is one thing reformers should not do, it is to press too 
hard for overly liberalized pretrial release, even if SB 10 is overturned 
by referendum in 2020. As discussed above, this type of aggressive 
reform will always be faced with vehement opposition from those who 
value order and safety, as well as from actors within the court systems. 
At best, such reforms would never be fully implemented (if they ever 
get implemented). At worst, they might result in a backlash that makes 
things worse than they are now—as demonstrated by the fact that 
pretrial detention rates skyrocketed a mere twenty years after the 
liberal bail reforms of the 1960s thanks to the war on crime. 
With an eye towards compromising with institutional actors and 
those who seek to increase order in society, however, small steps can 
be taken towards progress. Transparency, self-evaluation, reduction in 
detention rates for low-level criminals (particularly those who would 
otherwise be stuck in jail due to inability to post bail), and a system 
that does not exacerbate racial disparities—while these are not the fix-
all, utopian goals envisioned by pretrial detention reformers—are 
good, reasonable targets to work toward. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
History shows that when idealists expect too much of criminal 
justice reform, they are disappointed over and over again. This is in 
large part due to a failure to understand that actors within the court 
system have little incentive to implement liberalizing reforms, and 
every incentive to keep things the way they are. This does not mean 
that SB 10 is destined to fail; it just means that reformers should have 
reasonable expectations for its success. The problems created by 
judicial or prosecutorial discretion are unlikely to be eliminated. But, 
if reformers focus on ensuring that both the risk assessment tool and 
the court’s methodologies are transparent, as well as making sure that 
the Judicial Council self-evaluates and promises to improve on 
failures, SB 10 could represent the first steps toward a fairer pretrial 
system. 
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